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Abstract 
In recent years, counterfeit parts have infiltrated the defense supply chain, which provides replacement parts and sub-systems for 
deployed systems.  This creates a significant amount of risk.  Both government and industry have formulated and implemented 
various policy initiatives to address the problem, including inspections, penalties and trusted sourcing.  However, the problem is 
still on-going.  Additional policies are under consideration, and the unintended effects of policies are not known.  To study the 
problem and potential policy solutions, we present an enterprise simulation model of counterfeit parts intrusion and policy 
alternatives.  The model reflects the defense enterprise, tiers of suppliers, counterfeiters and other government policy actors.  
Interactions of these actors and their reactions to events and policies form an important part of the enterprise system behavior.  
Policies, their effects and their interactions are detailed in this multi-stakeholder environment. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, counterfeit parts have infiltrated the defense supply chain, which provides replacement parts and 
sub-systems for deployed systems1,2,3.  This situation creates a significant amount of risk, since counterfeit 
constituent parts may degrade performance of systems and may also cause safety concerns.  For instance, many 
counterfeit parts are used or defective parts passed as new4.  Thus, they typically would have worse reliability than 
would a genuine new part.  Others are fake parts imprinted with a logo representing the intellectual property (IP) 
rights holder.   
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Primarily, counterfeit parts have been electronics, such as integrated circuits (ICs), imported into the United 
States5.  When counterfeits occur as system components, such as ICs, they are generally difficult to detect once 
assembled into a higher-order sub-system.  Thus, it is important to detect such counterfeits prior to assembly into 
higher-order sub-systems.  For any one end-product system, though, the defense supply chain can be quite complex.  
For example, the supply chain for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has approximately 1,580 suppliers arranged in 
multiple tiers6.  Other programs have similarly complex supply chains.  A supplier providing a component such as an 
IC may have that IC pass through a series of assembly operations whereby the sub-system into which it is assembled 
is itself assembled into a higher order sub-system, which in turn is assembled into another higher-order sub-system.  
The lead systems integrator (LSI) has overall responsibility for the end-product system, but may not even have 
visibility into the supply chain tiers that extend past its direct suppliers.  This presents a vulnerability to 
counterfeiting, since intrusion may occur many times removed from the LSI or depots that sustain systems. 
Counterfeiting is driven by a variety of factors.  As electronics become commoditized, the original component 
manufacturers (OCMs) leave the market, forcing suppliers using those products to find alternative sources.  This 
increases the probability of counterfeiting due to less reliable sourcing.  This is compounded by the increasing 
lifespans of deployed systems, requiring replacement parts for many years after an OCM has potentially left the 
market.  In electronics, most manufacturing has been off-shored, where IP protections typically are less stringent 
than in the U.S.  Counterfeiters clearly have found profit opportunities, as used components can be passed as new for 
profit.  Additional drivers come into play, as well7. 
This paper presents enterprise modeling as a way to test different policies for addressing the problem of 
counterfeit parts.  To wit, Section 2 describes the nature of the counterfeit parts problem as an enterprise problem.  
Enterprise problems and models to address them are a relatively new area of research.  Next, Section 3 presents an 
enterprise simulation model of the counterfeit parts problem.  Section 4 discusses policies, their interactions and 
results to date.  Finally, Section 5 concludes and provides avenues of future research. 
2. Counterfeit Parts Infiltration as an Enterprise Problem 
The issue of counterfeit parts in the defense supply chain cuts across many different organizations and 
organization types.  For purposes of modeling, we consider this set of organizations as an enterprise in the sense that 
they are directing their efforts and resources toward common goals8.  In this case, the goal is to prevent counterfeit 
infiltrations for purposes of national security, as well as health and safety.  This is a public-private enterprise 
encompassing government agencies and private firms (e.g., defense suppliers)9. No single organization has full 
control of the entire enterprise.  The Department of Defense (DoD) issues guidelines and policies to address issues 
such as counterfeiting.  However, these policies typically leave some discretion to individual defense programs and 
suppliers.  Moreover, suppliers can choose whether or not to participate in the defense supply chain.  In addition to 
DoD, other agencies such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of Justice (DoJ) have 
jurisdiction over aspects of counterfeiting such as inspection and interdiction at import locations and prosecution of 
offenders, respectively.  
Of course, the counterfeiters operate as part of the enterprise, being that they are suppliers, but they operate 
largely outside enterprise control.  They adapt methods and strategies to government actions.  For instance, a 
counterfeiter may improve the quality of a counterfeit item to avoid detection via improved testing.  Likewise, a 
counterfeiter may adjust its supply channels to avoid interdiction at points with improved detection.  Similarly, 
government agencies and private firms adapt to new counterfeiting threats with policies and actions.  Thus, this 
enterprise as with many operates as a complex adaptive system10, which is characterized by multiple independent 
agents that react to information and incentives in ways that create unpredictable overall system behavior.   
Enterprise modeling and simulation is a relatively new approach to studying complex systems with organizational 
elements11,12,13.  Enterprise modeling often is used to identify policies to solve problems, as well as characterize 
secondary or unintended effects of policies14,15.  In the counterfeit parts domain, the DoD has a number of different 
policy levers that it can apply16,17,18,19,20.  For instance, it can mandate that programs use qualified suppliers for all 
components and sub-systems that comprise a deployed system, where a qualified supplier is defined by a specific 
qualification process.  It can impose penalties on suppliers who pass counterfeit components in their sub-systems.  It 
can mandate testing of components at entry points to DoD programs.  Each policy has strengths and potential 
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drawbacks.  For instance, testing is expensive and can yield significant false positives20.  Individual programs may 
enact policies, as well.  In addition, other government agencies such as CBP and DoJ have policy influence on 
counterfeiting.  The intent here is to use enterprise modeling to test such policies for effectiveness before 
implementation in the real enterprise. 
3. Enterprise Simulation Model of Counterfeit Parts Infiltration 
The enterprise simulation model for counterfeit parts is based on an enterprise modeling methodology21,22 and a 
generic supply chain based enterprise framework7. The framework is divided into five interacting models 
summarized below. 
 
x A systems and constituents model represents the various systems, sub-systems and components plus the 
architecture that relates them to one another.  This is captured in a bill-of-materials. 
x A supply chain model represents the factories and inventories for each component and sub-system, plus the flow 
of those constituents to the LSI for final assembly into a system and to depots and other locations for use in 
sustainment. 
x An enterprise actor model represents the various suppliers that own factories and other locations in the supply 
chain model and their behavior over time as they react to changing conditions and policies. 
x A policy actor model represents the various agencies and other organizations that enact policies affecting 
counterfeit parts. 
x An exogenous environment model represents the external world and its effect on counterfeiting and anti-
counterfeiting policies. 
 
The model is implemented using AnyLogic™ 7, primarily as an agent-based simulation with Java™ class 
extensions.  The focus here is on the first four models above. 
Specifically, the system and constituents model contains two end-product systems – a fighter jet and a high-
altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).  The bill of materials contains two levels of sub-system objects for each, as 
well as one level of component objects.  The components correspond to electronics that may be counterfeited.  Note 
that only the sub-systems and components subject to counterfeit risk are included, as inclusion of all sub-systems and 
components would be computationally expensive.  In the model, systems, sub-systems and components are 
instantiated as agents that reference information in the bill of materials and execute behaviors. 
Correspondingly, a supply chain provides the various sub-systems and components.  Factory agents fabricate 
components and ship them to other factories for assembly into sub-systems.  These sub-systems are then shipped to 
other factory agents where they are assembled into higher-order sub-systems.  These sub-systems are mostly line-
replaceable units (LRUs) that feed directly into the end-product system, and that can be repaired and replaced into 
in-service systems.  For sustainment, spare sub-systems and components are shipped to depot agents where 
maintenance, repair and replacement are performed.  In-service systems have needs for these operations, in turn 
creating demand for sub-systems and components.  Some component suppliers are foreign, in which case the 
components are sent through customs agents where they may be inspected.  Similarly, suppliers may institute control 
points where components are tested prior to transfer from the consumer supply chain to a DoD program.  The 
systems and constituents model and the supply chain model are shown in Figure 1. 
Factories are owned by supplier agents in the enterprise actor model.  The supply chain evolves over time due to 
the actions of these suppliers.  An OCM supplier may decide to leave the market for a particular component when it 
loses profitability, for example.  This marks the beginning of a component’s journey to obsolescence.  This supplier 
sends a notification to all suppliers that make sub-systems using this component and then shuts down production.  
Those suppliers then search for an alternate source.  Potentially available options include franchise manufacturers 
(authorized by the OCM that holds IP rights), authorized distributors (likewise authorized by the OCM), brokers 
(non-authorized distributors), or from potentially unknown sources (e.g., internet sites).  In some cases, certain 
obsolete components are available from a government-certified firm.  Aside from the government-certified firms, 
this represents a series of sources with increasing risk of counterfeit infiltration. 
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A percentage of foreign suppliers provide counterfeit components.  Typically, the counterfeit components are 
imported via a broker.  A percentage of brokers knowingly import counterfeit components.  A percentage of 
imported components are inspected at a customs point.  Those identified as counterfeits are called “counterfeit 
suspects.”  CBP may enlist the aid of the IP holder to help with suspect identification.  Suspects are interdicted.  It 
should be noted that suspects can be either true positives (counterfeits) or false positives (genuine components 
misidentified as counterfeits).  Similarly, components are tested at DoD control points (using more sophisticated 
methods).  Such tests may be destructive, and they also involve the possibility of false positives.  A false positive 
results in discarded good product. 
Fig. 1. (a) system and constituent model; (b) supply chain model. 
Identification of counterfeit suspects can result in referral of the importer to DoJ for prosecution.  Since the 
control points are operated by suppliers, it should be noted that there is substantial lack of knowledge in the defense 
industrial base about proper reporting of counterfeit suspects9. The DoJ may indict knowing importers as in a recent 
incident23, in which case they are shut down, and others seeing the consequences may decide to exit the business.  
The DoJ indicts based on its level of resources and on the priority between IP violations and fraud.  IP violations 
occur when an IP holder’s logo is forged onto a fake component.  Fraud, on the other hand, involves passing used or 
defective components as new. 
4. Policy Modeling, Effects and Interactions 
The policy model contains the following agents that can adopt anti-counterfeiting policies.   
 
x The DoD can set policies regarding sourcing of parts over all programs.  One policy currently being adopted is 
that such parts must be purchased from qualified suppliers.  It is assumed here that qualified suppliers include 
OCMs, franchisees and authorized distributors.  Any parts purchased from other sources must be tested at a 
control point.  This policy would apply to all sub-systems at or above a certain level of criticality (from one to 
five, with five being the highest). 
x DoD programs select a strategy to manage obsolete sub-systems.  One such strategy is to perform a design 
refresh, while another is to purchase a “lifetime buy” of components from an OCM before it exits the market.  
x DoJ can set the resource level that it expends on counterfeiting cases, and it can also prioritize IP cases versus 
fraud cases. 
x CBP can set the percentage of component lots that it inspects, and it can also set whether it cooperates with IP 
holders to identify suspects. 
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It should be noted that there certainly are other policies that can be added, for example tracking components 
throughout their lifecycle, enforcing penalties on suppliers that (unknowingly) pass counterfeit components in their 
sub-systems, or having programs be able to set a level of testing or supplier qualification themselves. 
In addition, an analyst can set the percentage of foreign component suppliers that counterfeit and the risk 
behaviors of counterfeiters as two factors in the exogenous environment model.  The simulation is implemented so 
that the policy options and exogenous environment options are selectable on an interface display, which also shows 
the consequences of these selections in terms of effectiveness (counterfeit suspects identified and counterfeit 
escapes), as well as cost.  The interface is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Simulation interface. 
In the simulation run reflected in the figure, the DoD and DoD program policy options are not enabled.  Hence, 
there are no policy costs incurred.  The number of escapes (counterfeit component lots passing into the program) are 
shown over time for each program.  Since qualification/testing is not enabled, there are no suspects reported at the 
program level.  Customs inspects 20% of incoming lost randomly, and the number of suspects and escapes are 
shown over time.  It should be noted that many of the escapes from Customs are still in the supply chain and have 
not made it yet to a program.  Finally, DoJ has not issued any indictments during the simulated time period. 
Currently, the model is populated with test data.  The goal is to provide data that is realistic for a given scneario 
using a reasonably generic data structure.  The motivation here is that real data is difficult to verify for many aspects 
of the model due to the sensitive nature of the problem, distributed nature of data across multiple agencies, and lack 
of knowledge about counterfeiters and their operations.  Thus, an analyst would be responsible for populating the 
model with data from their scenario of interest. 
To illustrate use of the model, the following scenarios are analyzed.  Table 1 shows average results for the various 
metrics over the four different scenarios for a ten year period with ten replications. 
 
x Scenario 1.  Baseline scenario from Figure 2. 
x Scenario 2.  Baseline scenario plus supplier qualification for all sub-systems. 
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x Scenario 3.  Baseline scenario plus increased resources for prosecution (50%). 
x Scenario 4.  Scenarios 2 and 3 combined. 
     Table 1. Example counterfeiting scenarios. 
Model outputs (averaged over ten replications) Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Escapes – fighter jet program (lots) 56.3 13.8 53.8 12.1 
Suspects – fighter jet program (lots) 0 72.3 0 70.3 
Policy cost – fighter jet program ($M) 0 30.4 0 30.7 
Escapes – UAV program (lots) 51.7 11.6 48.9 11.4 
Suspects – UAV program (lots) 0 69.7 0 65.2 
Policy cost – UAV program ($M) 0 31.9 0 32.5 
Escapes – Customs (lots) 640.2 636.0 635.2 632.1 
Suspects – Customs (lots) 595.3 608.7 598.8 580.5 
Policy cost – Customs ($M) 56.1 55.7 57.9 57.1 
Indictments – DoJ (lots) 0 0 65.4 66.5 
Policy cost – DoJ ($M) 0 0 53.6 52.1 
 
In this relatively simple example, supplier qualification reduces counterfeit rates (escapes) at the programs.  
Likewise, increasing DoJ resources appears to have an impact on counterfeit rates in general (escapes and suspects), 
although not very large.  Combining these two approaches yields a decrease in counterfeits, but also at a policy cost 
of $172.4M versus that of $56.1M for the baseline scenario.  It should be noted that there is a one-time cost 
associated with policy start-up (e.g., qualification proccess for suppliers), as well as a recurring cost.  The example 
demonstrates the goal to provide an environment where trade-offs between counterfeits, costs and other metrics can 
be evaluated. 
5. Conclusions and Future Research 
Counterfeit parts continue to be a potentially serious problem in the defense supply chain.  This paper has 
presented an enterprise model addressing the problem of counterfeit parts in the defense supply chain.  The goal is to 
use this model as an aid to test anti-counterfeiting policies before implementation and to gain insight into potential 
interactions among policies.  Such a model can be used in a setting with different stakeholder types so that different 
perspectives can be shared on how potential solutions affect different parts of the enterprise. 
In developing the model, a number of stakeholders from the defense and related communities were engaged in 
discussion sessions7.  These sessions will continue to be used to refine the model, add policies, and test different 
scenarios and policies.  The current model illustrates cost consequences.  Current work is aimed at providing a 
system reliability consequence for counterfeit components, since counterfeits can have an impact on reliability and 
hence availability.  In addition, current work is ongoing to use the model as an input to other systems-of-systems 
design tools seeking for purposes of system selection.  
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